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OBJECTIONS TO DISCLOSURE 
SETTLEMENTS: A HOW-TO GUIDE 
SEAN J. GRIFFITH* & ANTHONY A. RICKEY** 
 
Stockholder litigation remains in crisis, with over seventy percent of 
major mergers and acquisitions subject to litigation. A contributing factor is 
the breakdown of the adversary process at settlement, when former 
opponents join hands in favor of a compromise that too often expends 
corporate resources for no real recovery to the plaintiff class. One obvious 
corrective is the shareholder’s objection to settlement, which restores 
adversarial character to the settlement process. Shareholders, however, face 
substantial difficulties in making such objections. In this article, the authors 
detail the problem and share their experiences in addressing these obstacles, 
providing a how-to manual for future shareholder objections to class action 
settlements in merger litigation. 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................... 282 
I. The Settlement Approval Process .......................................................... 288 
II. Presenting an Objection ....................................................................... 292 
A. The Client ........................................................................................ 292 
B. Evaluating the Settlement ................................................................ 295 
C. Drafting the Objection ..................................................................... 297 
1. Requirements of the Preliminary Approval Order ....................... 297 
2. Placing the Objection in Context.................................................. 299 
3. Challenge the Disclosures ............................................................ 303 
 a) Additional Financial Projections ............................................. 304 
 b) Other Categories of Disclosures .............................................. 307 
4. Challenge the Release .................................................................. 308 
5. Challenge the Investigation .......................................................... 310 
6. Challenge Attorneys’ Fees ........................................................... 312 
D. Anticipating Possible Opposition .................................................... 314 
1. Distinguishing Meritorious Objections From Those of 
“Professional Objectors” .................................................................. 314 
                                                                                                                 
 * T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. 
 ** Attorney, Margrave Law LLC. The content of this article is general information 
only, not legal advice or legal opinion based on any specific facts or circumstances. The 
viewpoints and any errors herein are the authors’ alone. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
282 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:281 
 
 
2. Discovery ..................................................................................... 315 
III. Why Represent Objectors?.................................................................. 316 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 319 
Introduction 
In his classic polemic Against Settlement, Owen Fiss attacked the general 
preference for settlement over adjudication in the civil justice system on 
four basic grounds.1 First, consent to settlement is often coerced.2 Second, 
settlement bargains are often “struck by someone without authority.”3 
Third, judicial involvement after settlement is often difficult.4 And fourth, 
“justice may not be done.”5 Settlement, for Fiss, is merely a “capitulation to 
the conditions of mass society,” not a point of pride for any civil justice 
system.6 
The settlement of merger litigation exhibits these four characteristics in 
spades. Stockholders who are rationally indifferent to settlements that offer 
them no real benefit do not “consent” so much as acquiesce.7 Despite rules 
that purport to require class certification as early as practicable,8 plaintiffs’ 
lawyers frequently appoint themselves and negotiate settlement long before 
they receive legal authority to represent the class.9 Approval of a class 
settlement at least nominally precludes subsequent litigation of the released 
claims, which are often defined to include any imaginable claim relating in 
any way to the underlying facts, in any court anywhere in the country.10 
The unjust results of this system can be seen in the flood of claims 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation 
by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2015); see also MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.62 (2004) (noting that where “the recovery for each 
class member is small, the paucity of objections may reflect apathy rather than satisfaction”). 
 8. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23. 
 9. See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 951, 957-62 (2014) (arguing that these actions involve class counsel selling 
something they don’t own); Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort 
Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 900 (1995) (distinguishing settlement class 
actions from ordinary settlements on the basis of “proxies” for negotiation and the 
substitution of “judicial fiat” for contractual agreement). 
 10. Griffith, supra note 7, at 16-17. 
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unleashed by class plaintiffs and the lack of benefit produced for 
stockholders. Until very recently, more than 90% of all announced mergers 
over $100 million attracted shareholder litigation, meaning that corporate 
directors, no matter how loyal and careful, could expect to be sued when 
they recommended a transaction.11 The sue-on-every-case nature of the 
litigation provided very real incentives for lawyers bringing such claims to 
settle for six-figure fees without seriously investigating the underlying 
claims, trading potentially valuable shareholder rights for worthless 
disclosure settlements.12 
The essential bulwark against the Fissian vision of settlement is the 
fairness hearing, at which a judge reviews the fairness and reasonableness 
of the bargain prior to approving the settlement and thereby binding absent 
class members.13 At the fairness hearing, 
[i]f class action attorneys sell out their clients, the judge should 
perceive that the settlement does not live up to the value of the 
claims and reject it accordingly. Conversely, if class action 
attorneys file a frivolous case, the judge should perceive that the 
settlement is merely a nuisance payment, reject it for that reason, 
and dismiss the case.14  
As Fiss saw it, a judge compares the outcome at settlement with what he or 
she imagines the outcome at trial would have been, except that there has 
been no trial, no cross-examination or impeachment of witnesses, and no 
opposing argument.15 Instead, “the judge can no longer count on the 
thorough presentation promised by the adversary system. The contending 
parties have struck a bargain, and have every interest in defending the 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015 2-3 
(Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2715890; RAVI SINHA, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC 
COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2015 AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION, 1 (2016), https://www.corner 
stone.com/Publications/Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2016.pdf. 
 12. See Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of 
Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 882 (2016) (describing the “disclosure 
settlement bar” as firms pursuing “a business model of entering into disclosure settlements 
and thereby collecting risk-free fee awards near the outset of a case. These firms released 
Revlon claims after a purported investigation of their viability, even though they had no 
demonstrated track record of pursuing Revlon claims for significant monetary relief. In an 
unknown number of cases, these firms released valuable Revlon claims.”). 
 13. William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory 
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1444 (2006).  
 14. Id.  
 15. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 1075, 1082.  
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settlement and in convincing the judge that it is in accord with the law.”16 
Or, as Macey and Miller described the problem, settlement hearings are 
“pep rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense 
counsel.”17  
In the context of disclosure settlements, the lack of an adversarial 
element requires a judge, acting on his or her own, to conduct a forensic 
analysis of the proxy statement, seeking to determine whether the 
supplemental disclosures materially altered the total mix of information 
available to shareholders.18 This involves a line-by-line analysis of the 
supplemental disclosures, weighing the materiality of each in the context of 
not only other information disclosed in the proxy statement but also all 
other publicly available information. Regarding financial disclosures, the 
analysis entails some knowledge of finance and valuation, along with an 
understanding of how specific variables would or would not affect the 
overall value of the corporation and its business. Trial judges who do not 
confront these issues on a regular basis may be unaccustomed to this kind 
of analysis, and the reality of crowded dockets creates an additional hurdle 
for judges acting as aggressive settlement “gatekeepers.”19 
Academics have repeatedly insisted that these problems could be solved, 
or at least mitigated, through a reinvigoration of the adversary process 
during settlement.20 The Delaware Court of Chancery recently endorsed 
this idea in In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, suggesting that 
disclosure claims are best resolved in an adversarial context.21 Where such 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id. at 1082. 
 17. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1991). 
 18. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 19. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 388, 402-03 
(2011). 
 20. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in 
Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1122 n.309 (2013) (arguing that courts should 
“appoint an objector as a kind of guardian ad litem for the class” and compiling sources 
supporting the proposal); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action 
Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 128 (2003) (advocating an active adversarial process during 
fairness hearings as “a kind of trial on the merits of the settlement”); Amanda M. Rose, 
Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and 
Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1354-64 (2008) (developing 
an “oversight approach” for the SEC in 10b-5 cases); Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 1452-67 
(examining various proposals for reducing agency costs at the settlement stage, including 
use of devil’s advocates). 
 21. 129 A.3d at 896.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss1/8
2017]        OBJECTIONS TO DISCLOSURE SETTLEMENTS 285 
 
 
context is not available, the court suggested that “it may be appropriate . . . 
to appoint an amicus curiae to assist the court in its evaluation of the 
alleged benefits of the supplemental disclosures, given the challenges posed 
by the non-adversarial nature of the typical disclosure settlement 
hearing.”22 Thus far, however, we are unaware of any court that has 
appointed such advocates. 
But judicial action is not the only means to ensure an adversarial 
settlement process. Private actors can do the job by objecting to settlements 
of shareholder class actions. The authors have been involved in several such 
objections, either as objector or as counsel.23 Several of these objections 
have resulted in settlements being dismissed, releases being narrowed to 
preserve potential claims, or fees to class counsel being reduced.24 In 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. at 898–99. 
 23. See, e.g., Brief of Sean J. Griffith as Amicus Curiae, Trulia, 129 A.3d 884 (C.A. No. 
10020-CB), 2015 WL 6391945 [hereinafter Griffith Amicus Curiae Brief in Trulia] 
(opposing settlement); Objection of Sean J. Griffith to Proposed Settlement and Application 
for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 
10484-VCG (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015), 2015 WL 4384114 [hereinafter Objection of Sean J. 
Griffith to Proposed Settlement in Riverbed]; Transcript of Proceedings at 44-53, Gordon v. 
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. (Gordon I), Index No. 653084/13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014), 
2014 WL 7250212, rev’d, Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. (Gordon II), 148 A.3d 146 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (highlighting the expert testimony provided by Griffith); Statement of 
Reasons, Vergiev v. Aguero, Docket No.: L-2276-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 6, 
2016) [hereinafter Statement of Reasons in Vergiev] (showing the reasons Griffith objected 
to settlement of merger litigation); Final Order and Judgment, Vergiev, Docket No.:L-2276-
15 [hereinafter Final Order and Judgment in Vergiev]; Entry of Appearance, In re PMFG, 
Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11223-VCS (Del. Ch. filed June 29, 2015) (filing by 
Griffith for notice of appearance and intent to object to settlement of merger litigation); 
Bushansky v. Remy Int’l, Inc., ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2017 WL 3530108 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 
2017) (sustaining objection to settlement of merger litigation); Order After Hearing on July 
19, 2016, In re Pharmacyclics, Inc. Shareholder Litig., Lead Case No. 115-CV-278055 (Cal. 
Super. Ct.—Santa Clara Cty. July 20, 2016) (overruling Griffith’s objection to the proposed 
settlement of merger litigation); Affidavit of Sean J. Griffith in Support of James C. 
Snyder’s Objection to the Proposed Settlement, Corwin v. British Am. Tobacco PLC, 14-
CvS-8130 (N.C. Super. Feb. 17, 2016) (filing of an expert affidavit by Griffith in support of 
shareholder objection to merger settlement). Griffith also provided expert affidavits in: 
Richards v. FX Energy, Inc., Case No. A-15-726409-C (Nev. Super.—Clark Cty.) and In re 
Compuware Corp. S’holder Litig., 14-011437-CB (Mich. Super. Ct.—Wayne Cty.) (filed 
Oct. 1, 2015).  
 24. Of the matters listed in supra note 23: Trulia, 884 A.3d at 907-08 (rejecting 
settlement); Riverbed, 2015 WL 5458041, at *8 (reducing fees); Gordon I, 2014 WL 
7250212, at *9 (rejecting settlement initially); Gordon II, 148 A.3d at 161 (reversing Gordon 
I and implementing enhanced standards for settlement approvals); Vergiev, Docket No.: L-
2276-15 (rejecting settlement), Stipulation and [Proposed] Order of Dismissal at 4, PMFG, 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
286 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:281 
 
 
addition to the specific results achieved in individual cases, to the extent 
that such objections reduce the incentive for parties to bring less 
meritorious litigation—in effect, to reduce the rate of the “merger tax”—
they have systemic benefits as well.25  
Yet objectors rarely appear.26 Moreover, courts may be wary of 
objections out of concern that some litigants may simply seek to hold up the 
settlement process in order to extort a fee.27 Although this is a real concern 
in other contexts, as a practical matter, the threat of “professional objectors” 
remains wholly theoretical in disclosure settlements.28 Nevertheless, 
objectors and counsel seeking to press good faith objections face being 
characterized as such.29 Perhaps the most significant obstacle, however, is 
                                                                                                                 
C.A. No. 11223-VCS, 2016 WL 4594731, at *2 (resulting in a withdrawn settlement and a 
voluntary dismissal), Remy, 2017 WL 3530108, at *10 (sustaining objection and denying 
approval of settlement or award of fees to plaintiffs’ counsel).  
 25. See Griffith, supra note 7, at 17-19, 46. 
 26. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in 
Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1548-50 
(2004) (showing that the objection rate is low across case types). 
 27. See generally Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or 
Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403 (analyzing issues of fairness and efficiency 
behind class actions); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 1623 (2009) (highlighting concerns of objector “blackmail” and the use of quick-pay 
provisions used by class action counsel). 
 28. The authors are unaware of any “professional objector”—that is to say, an objector 
seeking merely to settle for a fee—ever appearing in a disclosure settlement, although class 
plaintiffs have raised such concerns to the Delaware Court of Chancery. See Riverbed, 2015 
WL 5458041, at *2 (“The Plaintiffs opine that if objectors in Mr. Griffith’s position are 
permitted to be heard, ‘professional’ objectors with nefarious strike-suit motives will pop up 
like mushrooms after a two-day rain.”). This is not surprising. Just as class plaintiffs in 
M&A cases derive settlement leverage by threatening to disrupt deal closure, professional 
objectors derive settlement leverage by threatening to delay the flow of settlement 
consideration to class members or hold up fees to class plaintiffs through spurious appeals. 
See Brunet, supra note 27, at 435-39. 
Disclosure settlements, however, do not lend themselves to either form of objection 
extortion. Opportunistic objectors cannot interpose themselves between the class and its 
supposed consideration, because class counsel seek to settle months after the supplemental 
disclosures have been issued. See id. at 432-33. Nor can objectors credibly threaten to delay 
payment of class counsel’s fees. See id. at 428-29. Many disclosure settlements contain a 
“quick-pay” provision, under which defendants agree to pay fees when the trial court 
approves the settlement, on the condition that plaintiffs will repay the fees if a settlement is 
overturned on appeal. Fitzpatrick, supra note 27, at 1641, 1645. 
 29. Class plaintiffs and their counsel are frequent litigants in M&A class actions. See 
generally C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Who Are the Top Law Firms? Assessing the Value of 
Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 122 (2016); Adam B. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss1/8
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the dearth of material available to practitioners describing how to evaluate, 
and ultimately litigate, objections to disclosure settlements. This article 
addresses the issue, not as a theoretical exercise, but as a how-to manual. 
Part I provides a brief overview of the settlement approval process and 
where objections fit into it. Part II walks through the process of presenting 
an objection and addresses some of the challenges facing practitioners. Part 
III then looks at reasons that objectors, and their counsel, may find this 
style of litigation to be intellectually, and perhaps financially, rewarding. 
Before proceeding, two caveats are in order. First, we have provided this 
content as general information only. It is not legal advice or legal opinion 
regarding any specific factual or legal circumstances. We address our 
comments principally to practitioners who might seek to represent objectors 
in disclosure settlements. It is not meant as a substitute for specific legal 
advice to stockholders, who would be well-served by seeking appropriate 
counsel.30 
Second, an aspiring objector’s counsel could reasonably ask why we are 
publishing a blueprint allowing “competitors” to replicate our efforts. The 
answer is as much practical as it is policy-oriented. Following Trulia, the 
percentage of M&A transactions subject to stockholder challenge fell—but 
only to about 60% in the first half of 2016.31 By the end of 2016, another 
study found that the rate of stockholder challenges had risen to 73%.32 
Moreover, stockholder plaintiffs (and their counsel) increasingly began to 
                                                                                                                 
Badawi & David H. Webber, Does the Quality of the Plaintiffs’ Law Firm Matter in Deal 
Litigation? (Dec. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2469573. 
Yet they will commonly assert that an objector, or their counsel, are “professional 
objectors.” See, e.g., Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Final Approval of Settlement and Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of 
Expenses and in Response to Objections at 4, Vergiev, Docket No.: L-2276-15 [hereinafter 
Vergiev Reply Brief].  
 30. For the avoidance of doubt, unless otherwise noted references to “plaintiffs,” 
“defendants,” or “objectors” performing some action follow the typical legal conceit of 
describing not the party, but their counsel. Although it may result in some confusion, most 
litigators in this area are used to reading “plaintiffs filed their brief” or “objector presented 
an argument” and understanding that counsel were responsible for the actual filing of papers 
and presentation of arguments.  
 31. SINHA, supra note 11, at 1. 
 32. See Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation 20 (Univ. of 
Penn Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 17-6, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2922121 (showing 73% of all completed deals subject to litigation); id. at 22 (showing 
decline in filing of challenges to mergers in Delaware from 61% of all deals involving 
Delaware companies in 2015 to 32% in 2016, and rise of filing in federal court from 20% to 
37%). 
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bring cases outside of Delaware under the federal securities laws.33 At least 
at present, it seems that class plaintiffs face only a modest chance of facing 
a well-represented objection to a disclosure settlement.34 Thus, a 
sufficiently robust market exists that we have no need to jealously hide 
“trade secrets.” If objections are to play a role in stemming the tide of 
abusive M&A class actions, more attorneys, not fewer, are needed. 
I. The Settlement Approval Process 
Before diving into the nuts and bolts of an objection, it is worth briefly 
outlining the process by which disclosure settlements are approved. The 
classic pre-Trulia disclosure settlement followed a predictable pattern. In 
each year from 2009 through 2015, somewhere between 85% and 95% of 
all merger transactions over $100 million attracted litigation.35 In the first 
half of 2016, in the wake of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s and other 
courts’ efforts, filings fell and only 64% of all deals over $100 million 
attracted claims.36 This is a decline of roughly one-third from the high, but 
still twice the historical average.37 
Even following this modest decline, the process remains much the same. 
As the Court of Chancery memorably described it, “[T]he public 
announcement of virtually every transaction involving the acquisition of a 
public corporation provokes a flurry of class action lawsuits alleging that 
the target’s directors breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to sell the 
corporation for an unfair price.”38 Plaintiffs usually seek an injunction 
threatening the close of the deal, which provides settlement leverage.39 
There are variations on this theme: sometimes a plaintiff begins by 
alleging only claims related to the deal price, and then amends the 
complaint to include disclosure claims after the preliminary proxy is 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2016 MIDYEAR 
ASSESSMENT 10 (2016), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2016/Cornerstone-
Research-Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2016-MYA.pdf.  
 34. See William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, The Trouble with Trulia: 
Reevaluating the Case for Fee-Shifting Bylaws as a Solution to the Over Litigation of 
Corporate Claims, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED? EVALUATING DELAWARE’S 
DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW (Iman Anabtawi, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sung Hui Kim & 
James Park, eds., forthcoming late 2017) (noting that most courts that have approved post-
Trulia disclosure settlements have done so in the absence of an objector). 
 35. See Cain & Solomon, supra note 11, at 2, 2 tbl.A. 
 36. SINHA, supra note 11, at 1. 
 37. See id. at 2.  
 38. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 39. Id. at 892. 
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issued.40 Sometimes plaintiffs never amend their original complaint, 
although they seek to settle for disclosures.41 Sometimes (particularly if 
plaintiffs are pursuing securities claims rather than state-law fiduciary-duty 
claims) they wait to file lawsuits until after the preliminary (or even the 
definitive) proxy is filed.42 Whether disclosure allegations are brought in a 
complaint or not, however, the tactic is to threaten to prevent a deal from 
closing until defendants provide some additional information to 
stockholders and then to seek an attorney’s fee for the “benefit.” 
Defendants, who often seek to close million- or billion-dollar deals, 
desire closing certainty and a release of any claims that might arise out of 
the transaction. As such, they are often willing to “self-expedite” discovery, 
providing class plaintiffs with a standard set of “core documents” that 
purportedly allow plaintiffs to evaluate the transaction in more detail.43 The 
path to a disclosure settlement is then straightforward: 
Once the litigation is on an expedited track and the prospect of 
an injunction hearing looms, the most common currency used to 
procure a settlement is the issuance of supplemental disclosures 
to the target’s stockholders before they are asked to vote on the 
proposed transaction. The theory behind making these 
disclosures is that, by having the additional information, 
stockholders will be better informed when exercising their 
franchise rights. Given the Court’s historical practice of 
approving disclosure settlements when the additional 
information is not material, and indeed may be of only minor 
value to the stockholders, providing supplemental disclosures is 
a particularly easy “give” for defendants to make in exchange for 
a release.44 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See, e.g., id. at 888-89.  
 41. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint for Breaches of Fiduciary Duties, Evangelista v. 
Duggan, Case No.: 115CV278055 (Cal. Super. Ct.—Santa Clara Cty. filed Mar. 13, 2015), 
2015 WL 1133583 (asserting no disclosure claims). 
 42. See, e.g., Complaint for Violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 2, 
Berg v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., C.A. No. 1:17-cv-677 (W.D. Tex. July 14, 2017) (filing 
complaint after preliminary proxy published by defendants); Remy, 2017 WL 3530108, at *2 
(complaints filed after definitive proxy).  
 43. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 892. 
 44. Id. at 892-93 (footnotes omitted). 
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It often seems as if the claims regarding an unfair price or process are 
advanced only to get plaintiffs’ counsel’s foot in the door as soon as 
possible for leadership purposes.45  
Once an agreement is reached, the litigation takes on a non-adversarial 
character.46 Typically, the parties paper an initial deal through a 
memorandum of understanding (“MOU”), often filed with the court and 
disclosed to the market through an SEC filing.47 The MOU contains the 
supplemental disclosures, provides for a process for reaching a final 
settlement, and usually contains defendants’ admission that the lawsuit 
caused the supplemental disclosures and a provision for an attorney’s fee.48 
Stockholders then vote on the transaction. The vote is often almost 
unanimous—rarely do the supplemental disclosures cause stockholders to 
reassess the deal.49 
Months may pass between stockholder approval of a deal and a motion 
for court approval from class plaintiffs. During this period, class plaintiffs 
conduct “confirmatory discovery,” usually seeking additional documents 
and perhaps conducting depositions.50 While class counsel are theoretically 
attempting to “confirm” the value of the settlement, “given that plaintiffs’ 
counsel already have resigned themselves to settle on certain terms, 
confirmatory discovery rarely leads to a renunciation of the proposed 
settlement and, instead, engenders activity more reflective of ‘going 
through the motions.’”51 
Eventually, the parties finalize their bargain, usually in a stipulation of 
settlement.52 The stipulation puts meat on the bones of the MOU, typically 
including 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed 
Complaint, 69 BUS. LAW. 1 (2013) (highlighting the various incentives plaintiffs’ counsel 
might have). 
 46. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 893. 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 889 (describing an agreement to enter into a MOU and publication 
with the SEC). 
 48. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding at 10, 17-18, Ex. A, Trulia, 129 A.3d 884 
(C.A. No. 10020-CB).  
 49. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the 
Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for 
Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 569 (2015).  
 50. See Trulia, 129 A.3d at 893, 893 n.24.  
 51. Id. at 893-94 n.24. 
 52. See, e.g., Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise, Settlement, and Release at 10, 
Trulia, 129 A.3d 884 (C.A. No. 10020-CB). 
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● an abbreviated history of the litigation, the discovery conducted 
by plaintiffs, and the resolution of the litigation; 
● an agreement by defendants not to object to a request for 
attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ counsel, so long as that request does 
not exceed an amount certain; and 
● a “quick-pay” provision, under which defendants agree to pay 
fees to plaintiffs upon approval by the trial court, regardless of 
any appeal, so long as plaintiffs agree to pay back any fee award 
if an appellate court reverses.53 
The stipulation often heralds a new, and oddly more expedited, phase of 
litigation. Plaintiff’s first step is typically to seek preliminary approval of 
the settlement, either by filing a motion or by simply submitting the 
stipulation of settlement, along with a proposed form of notice to 
stockholders, a proposed form of order that allows for a schedule leading to 
a final approval hearing, and a proposed form of order for final approval. A 
typical schedule will include 
● a deadline for the parties to provide notice to the stockholder 
class, often sixty days before the settlement hearing; 
● a deadline for plaintiffs to serve an opening brief in favor of the 
settlement; 
● a deadline for objections; and 
● a deadline for a reply by parties to the objection.54 
As discussed in more detail below, these deadlines may leave little time 
for a stockholder to raise substantive objections. One hindrance to the 
process is the limited notice required.55 Although notice to all shareholders 
is a required element of class action settlement procedures, the mechanics 
of shareholder notice are notoriously unreliable, especially where small 
shareholders are concerned.56 For instance, Professor Griffith received 
formal notice in less than half of the settlements in his portfolio of merger 
claims. 
In the absence of an objector, this process typically leads to a settlement 
hearing at which the court hears argument and then determines whether to 
approve the settlement. This process is not automatic, and courts sometimes 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See id. at 2-8, 22-24.  
 54. See, e.g., Scheduling Order at 5-8, Trulia, 129 A.3d 884 (C.A. No. 10020-CB). 
 55. See Brunet, supra note 27, at 447-48.  
 56. Lahav, supra note 20, at 83-84. 
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decline to approve settlements with weak consideration.57 Generally, 
however, a settlement hearing results in the approval of a release of claims 
against defendants and an award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiff’s counsel. 
II. Presenting an Objection 
Objectors throw a monkey wrench into the otherwise smooth process of 
approving these settlements. In the sections below, we examine processes 
for becoming, or finding, clients; considerations in drafting objections; 
handling opposition from the settling parties; and, particularly if the 
objection is successful, applying for attorneys’ fees and costs.  
A. The Client 
Stockholder objectors rarely receive any pecuniary benefit from 
challenging a settlement, although their counsel may seek fees. In the rare 
case where a stockholder feels that claims of actual value are being 
abandoned, the stockholder may seek to take over the litigation. In most 
cases, however, dissatisfied stockholders may believe that their rights are 
being given away to justify a fee to class counsel. When objectors have 
little personal incentive to retain an attorney, how are client and counsel to 
meet? 
Professor Griffith followed a pattern that, while not unique, remains 
unusual. Starting in late 2014, he began purchasing a portfolio of shares of 
public companies that announced a merger or acquisition, anticipating that 
these transactions would inevitably lead to litigation, which would 
ultimately be resolved in a disclosure settlement. Professor Griffith filed his 
first objection in the summer of 2015 and later filed an amicus brief in the 
Trulia case.58 Following Trulia, he continued to pursue a number of 
objections.59 In all of these cases, he has been represented by counsel 
working on a contingency basis. 
Thus far, this strategy has been relatively successful in sustaining an 
objection portfolio. So long as the parties continue to define settlement 
classes to include post-announcement buyers, post-announcement 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See, e.g., In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6574-CS, 2013 
WL 1191738, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) (rejecting proposed disclosure settlement). 
 58. See Objection of Sean J. Griffith to Proposed Settlement in Riverbed, supra note 23; 
Griffith Amicus Curiae Brief in Trulia, supra note 23. 
 59. See sources cited supra note 23. 
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purchases suffice to confer standing to object.60 To date, courts have been 
unreceptive to the argument that these post-merger purchases make 
Professor Griffith a “professional objector.”61 
This strategy, however, relies upon the existence of a litigant willing to 
maintain a portfolio specifically for this purpose, and an attorney willing to 
represent him in a number of courts across the nation. Professor Griffith has 
not sought compensation for his efforts, only fees for his counsel. But few 
stockholders are both knowledgeable of and engaged with the issue of over-
litigation of M&A claims, and yet also willing to dedicate time and money 
(in the form of investments) to such projects. 
The misaligned incentives that lead to a shortage of objectors mirrors 
those that justify the class action in the first place. Plaintiffs’ counsel 
confront similar challenges in seeking claimants that will represent a class. 
Thus, the techniques used by plaintiffs’ counsel may inform strategies 
useful to aspiring objectors’ counsel. 
Advertising. One possibility is advertising. High-volume filers of merger 
class actions often issue press releases publicizing “investigations” into 
mergers shortly after the mergers themselves are announced. These press 
releases contain little meaningful content except attorney contact 
information for stockholders interested in discussing “the legal 
ramifications of the investigation.”62 The releases are then picked up by 
popular stock market websites, such as Yahoo Finance, which often provide 
a link to press releases (and the law firm websites) at the bottom of the 
ticker page of each company under investigation.63 Judging from the 
abundance of such releases and the proliferation of merger litigation, these 
advertisements appear successful.64 Just as plaintiffs’ firms file press 
releases announcing investigations of mergers, an objector-focused practice 
might file press releases announcing investigations of settlements. 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 
5458041, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (holding that post-announcement purchasers who 
are members of the class are entitled to oppose a settlement). 
 61. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
 62. See, e.g., Brodsky & Smith, LLC Announces an Investigation of the Board of 
Directors of Diamond Resorts International, Inc. – DRII, YAHOO!: FINANCE (July 8, 2016), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/shareholder-brodsky-smith-llc-announces-013500654.html.  
 63. See, e.g., Summary on Diamond Resorts International, Inc. (DRII), YAHOO!: 
FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/quote/drii?ltr=1 (last visited May 13, 2017). 
 64. According to a possibly apocryphal story told to Griffith by a member of the 
Delaware bar, the major PR firms changed their policies and started accepting attorney press 
releases in 2009, the year merger litigation surged from its historic levels to over 85% of 
announced deals. 
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A word of caution is in order, however, for any attorney adopting such a 
strategy. Objectors, unlike plaintiffs, can anticipate that their motions will 
be subject to adversarial review and that plaintiffs will take issue with how 
an objector has come before a court. Attorney advertising rules differ 
throughout jurisdictions, and this article cannot attempt to summarize them. 
Objector’s counsel should expect that any foot-fault in client acquisition 
may be pursued as part of the response to an objection or in opposition to 
objector’s counsel’s request for a fee. (This is one reason that the authors 
have not, to date, adopted this advertising strategy.) 
Institutional clients. The ideal client for an objector practice is probably 
a large institutional investor who holds the market. This mirrors the strategy 
of certain plaintiffs’ firms that have relationships with large institutional 
investors, allowing these firms to file claims in most any apparent 
incidences of securities fraud.65 Such a client would likewise allow 
objections to most disclosure settlements.  
Finding such a client, however, may be challenging. Institutional 
investors, especially mutual funds, might for business reasons opt not to 
engage in shareholder litigation—for instance, they may find it difficult to 
win investments from corporate 401(k) plans when those plans are used as a 
platform for litigation against the company or, by extension, to contest 
settlement releases sought by the company.66 Certain pension funds, by 
contrast, do regularly engage in shareholder litigation.67 The motives of 
these funds in participating in shareholder litigation are unclear.68 To date, 
however, we are not aware of these institutional clients taking part in 
objections to disclosure litigation.  
Portfolio Monitoring. Taking another page from the class action 
plaintiff’s playbook, an attorney with clients who own stock (and who 
might have concerns about the over-litigation of corporate claims) could 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW 
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 20, 30-39 (2010). 
 66. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact 
of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. 
L. Q. 869, 881 (2005) (noting that “a substantial component of business for the major mutual 
funds involves managing retirement accounts for publicly traded issuers. . . . Fund managers 
might reasonably be concerned that active litigation participation would hurt their ability to 
compete for this business from managers of public companies”). 
 67. See, e.g., David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An 
Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative 
Actions, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 935-37 (2014). 
 68. Id. at 936 (reviewing the literature on “pay-to-play” participation by pension funds 
in shareholder class actions).  
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consider offering “portfolio monitoring” services. Plaintiffs’ attorneys 
offer, and even advertise, the option to “proactively monitor” an investor’s 
portfolio to determine whether investments have been subject to “fraud,” 
often for institutional clients.69 As a practical matter, this means that if a 
law firm wishes to prosecute a class action, it has a portfolio of existing 
clients to whom it may pitch the case. 
While some courts have expressed skepticism regarding portfolio-
monitoring agreements,70 others have held that such agreements do not 
represent a conflict with the interests of a class and expressly allow such 
plaintiffs and their counsel to serve as class representatives.71 An attorney 
wishing to develop an objector’s practice, particularly one whose existing 
clients have significant stockholdings, might consider adopting similar 
tactics. 
B. Evaluating the Settlement 
An attorney acting on behalf of his client next needs to determine 
whether the case is worth the client’s investment or, if the client is being 
represented on contingency, the attorney’s time, effort, and investment. 
At first blush, the over-litigation of corporate claims suggests that the 
preponderance of objections should be meritorious. After all, unless one 
believes that the overwhelming majority of corporate mergers are the 
product of fraud on the part of corporate directors, a large number of these 
cases must be meritless. Yet parties to a settlement can be expected to argue 
that their case is different: their disclosures are unusually significant, their 
efforts intensive, their industry unusually sensitive to additional 
information, such that this settlement merits approval.  
Based on our experience, there are a few materials that an objector 
should pull together as quickly as possible to evaluate a settlement. 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See Securities Fraud, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP, 
https://www.blbglaw.com/practices/110 (last visited May 13, 2017); Portfolio Monitoring 
Program, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, http://www.rgrdlaw.com/services-
portfolio-monitoring-program.html (last visited May 13, 2017). 
 70. In re Wash. Mut., Inc. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., Nos. 2:08-md-1919 MJP, 
Co8-387 MJP, 2010 WL 4272567, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2010) (“While Bernstein 
Litowitz’s tactics in recruiting [plaintiff] strike the Court as unseemly, the firm’s relationship 
with [plaintiff] does not defeat class certification.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Burns, 292 F.R.D. 515, 523-
24 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (finding plaintiff and counsel adequate to represent the class); In re 
UTStarcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C04-04908 JW, 2010 WL 1945737, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. May 
12, 2010) (holding that plaintiff and counsel with a portfolio-monitoring agreement are 
adequate for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)).  
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Depending on the stage of litigation, some of these may or may not be 
available: 
● The original proxy and the supplemental disclosures (both 
usually available from the SEC’s website) 
● The memorandum of understanding 
● The stipulation of settlement 
● The brief (if any) filed in support of preliminary approval of the 
settlement 
● The court order approving the settlement 
● The notice sent to the class (or the draft approved by the court) 
● The brief filed by plaintiffs in support of final approval of the 
settlement 
These documents, where available, should give objector’s counsel a good 
understanding of the claims plaintiffs are making as to the value provided to 
stockholders by the settlement.  
We have found that the best place to begin in case evaluation is the 
supplemental disclosures—the consideration purportedly garnered as a 
benefit for the class. As discussed below, the concept of “materiality” is 
central to the value of supplemental disclosures.72 Although that concept 
can be malleable, we have developed one good rule of thumb: how easy 
have class counsel made it for a court to evaluate the case? 
Proxy statements often run to hundreds of pages of densely printed 
text.73 Supplemental disclosures, which appear in later SEC filings, often 
present information by repeating entire paragraphs with minor alterations, 
making it difficult to tell what has changed. As the Delaware Court of 
Chancery noted, evaluating disclosures “often requires that the Court 
become essentially a forensic examiner of proxy materials.”74 Although it is 
not an infallible rule, we have found that plaintiffs with a strong set of 
supplemental disclosures tend to highlight them—for instance, by including 
a redline of the disclosures against the original proxy in court filings—
while litigants advancing weaker settlements will make it more difficult to 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See discussion infra Section II.C.2. 
 73. See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 899-900 (Del. Ch. 
2016) (“Here, the joint Proxy that Trulia and Zillow stockholders received in advance of 
their respective stockholders’ meetings to consider whether to approve the proposed 
transaction ran 224 pages in length, excluding annexes.”). 
 74. Id. at 894. 
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evaluate their achievements by, for instance, not filing a copy of the 
original proxy. 
A more fulsome discussion of materiality is provided in Part II. But 
objector’s counsel should consider these factors before deciding to invest 
the time and energy in launching an objection. 
While every case is different, a number of other factors often contribute 
to an initial case evaluation. For instance, the stipulation and the notice will 
generally contain a description of the released claims, which can be 
compared to “state of the art” releases in class settlements.75 Similarly, 
initial documents filed in support of a settlement will often contain a brief 
description of plaintiff’s purported investigation in support of the 
settlement, including whether and when they conducted depositions. 
Finally, an evaluation can include consideration of plaintiffs’ counsel. A 
respected practitioner in the Delaware Court of Chancery has theorized that, 
at least in Delaware, the class-action-litigation bar is split into two tiers, in 
which the top tier aggressively prosecutes litigation and the lower tier 
pursues disclosure settlements.76 While we have addressed this theory 
elsewhere,77 plaintiffs represented by counsel in the top-tier firms can be 
expected to rely on their reputation in support of the settlement.78 
C. Drafting the Objection 
If the evaluation shows that an objection has merit, the preliminary 
approval order will usually require that an objection be raised through a 
filing with the court. Pro se objectors sometimes file letters objecting to 
settlements, but represented objectors typically file papers that resemble an 
answering brief in opposition to plaintiff’s brief in support of final 
approval. Every objection will be unique and dependent on its facts. There 
are, however, some general tactics to consider. 
1. Requirements of the Preliminary Approval Order 
The shareholder notice or preliminary approval order sets forth the 
deadline for filing an objection to the settlement and provides what amounts 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See discussion infra Section II.C.4, for considerations of potential challenges to a 
release.  
 76. See Friedlander, supra note 12, at 904-10. 
 77. Sean J. Griffith & Anthony A. Rickey, Who Collects the Deal Tax, Where, and 
What Delaware Can Do About It, in HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER 
LITIGATION, Jessica Erickson, Sean Griffith, David H. Webber & Verity Winship eds, 
forthcoming 2018).  
 78. Friedlander, supra note 12, at 907-08.  
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to a briefing schedule.79 In most cases, the plaintiff’s brief in support of the 
settlement effectively functions as an opening brief, and the objection is the 
answer. Plaintiffs (and perhaps defendants) are typically afforded the 
opportunity to reply.80 While the order may allow for an objection to be 
filed at any time before the deadline, waiting until after plaintiffs file their 
opening brief allows an objection to usefully reflect plaintiffs’ arguments. 
An objector should be aware, however, of timing issues that may not be 
immediately apparent based on the scheduling order. For instance, 
Delaware law allows a party to file a brief under seal, so that its contents 
are not publicly available, so long as a public version of the brief omitting 
confidential information is filed five days later.81 If, as happened in two 
recent Delaware cases, the objection is due within five days of the initial 
filing, an objector will be effectively precluded from reviewing the brief in 
support of settlement prior to filing his own papers, unless he seeks a copy 
of the filing from plaintiffs or the court.  
In both of these cases, objector’s counsel reached out to plaintiffs and 
asked for a copy of the brief and an extension of time to file the objection.82 
In both cases, plaintiffs withdrew the proposed settlement before the 
objection deadline, so no objection was actually filed in either case.83 As a 
practice point, an objector or counsel faced with this situation should 
consider filing an entry of appearance so that there is some record on the 
docket of the intent to file an objection. 
The preliminary approval order and the settlement notice may also 
specify documents and information that must be filed along with an 
objection. These generally include notice of an intent to appear at the 
settlement hearing and proof of an objector’s stock ownership (and thus 
class membership). Proof of ownership—which, it should be noted, 
plaintiffs rarely provide in their own papers—may often be satisfied with a 
copy of a brokerage statement, although the requirements vary by 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 20, at 1084.  
 80. See id. at 1084-85.  
 81. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 5.1. 
 82. See, e.g., Stipulation and Order Amending Scheduling Order, In re PMFG, Inc. 
Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11223-VCS (Del. Ch. June 2, 2016) (extending filing deadline 
for objector); Stipulated and [Proposed] Order Regarding Mootness and Incentive Fee, In re 
Pepco Holdings, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. 9600-VCMR (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2016). Mr. 
Rickey represented the objector in Pepco, and Mr. Griffith (represented by Mr. Rickey) was 
the objector in PMFG.  
 83. See Stipulation and [Proposed] Order of Dismissal, PMFG, C.A. No. 11223-VCS 
(dismissing action); Stipulation and [Proposed] Order to Terminate Settlement and to 
Dismiss Action, Pepco, C.A. 9600-VCMR (dismissing action).  
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jurisdiction. Objectors may also be required to provide a list of other cases 
in which they have objected to class settlements. 
2. Placing the Objection in Context 
At the heart of any objection is the factual and legal basis upon which a 
court can reject a settlement. Again, every case is different, but we believe 
that most briefs should include a section that situates the disclosure 
settlement in the broader context of merger litigation generally. The degree 
of detail necessary will vary depending upon the particular jurisdiction. A 
brief before the Delaware Court of Chancery, or another state business 
court that frequently considers disclosure settlements, may merit less 
background detail than papers filed before a judge who rarely considers 
these issues. In any event, the brief should make clear that a given 
disclosure settlement is typical of a larger problem that other courts—
including the Delaware Court of Chancery,84 the Seventh Circuit Court of 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898-99 (Del. Ch. 2016) 
(announcing “plainly material” standard for supplemental disclosures and that disclosure 
settlements will henceforth be disfavored in Delaware). For Delaware cases scrutinizing 
settlement practices pre-Trulia, see In re Transatlantic Holdings, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. 
No. 6574-CS, 2013 WL 1191738, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) (refusing to approve 
settlement for lack of “any real investigation,” disclosure of additional background 
information, and overwhelming vote in favor of the transaction); Settlement Hearing and the 
Court’s Ruling at 24, In re Medicis Pharm. Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 7857-CS (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 26, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and noting that “giving out releases 
lightly . . . is something we’ve got to be careful about”); Settlement Hearing and Rulings of 
the Court at 20-21, Rubin v. Obagi Med. Prods., Inc., C.A. No. 8433-VCL (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 
2014), 2014 WL 2587074 (refusing to approve settlement and noting that “there are 
unknown unknowns in the world, and the type of global release . . . in this case and [similar] 
disclosure settlements provides expansive protection for the defendants against a broad 
range of claims, virtually all of which have been completely unexplored by the plaintiffs”); 
Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 69, In re Theragenics Corp. Stockholders 
Litig., C.A. No. 8790-VCL (Del. Ch. May 5, 2014), 2014 WL 2587094 (refusing to approve 
settlement and noting that “when a fiduciary action settles, I have to have some confidence 
that the issues in the case were adequately explored, particularly when there is going to be a 
global, expansive, all-encompassing release given”); Settlement Hearing and Request for 
Attorneys’ Fees and the Court’s Rulings at 73, Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., C.A. 
No. 7930–VCL (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015) (refusing to approve a disclosure-only settlement 
where plaintiffs settled for “precisely the type of nonsubstantive disclosures that routinely 
show up in these types of settlements”); Settlement Hearings and Rulings of the Court at 73, 
In re Aruba Networks, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C. A. No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015) 
(refusing to approve settlement and noting that plaintiffs provided inadequate representation 
to the class by filing litigation when “there wasn’t a basis to file in the first place” and then 
failing to aggressively litigate when discovery turned up potentially valuable information); 
In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041, at 
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Appeals,85 and trial courts in states such as Texas,86 New York,87 New 
Jersey,88 and North Carolina89—have begun to address. 
Differing jurisdictions may have their own binding precedent regarding 
settlements, and even specific law on disclosure settlements and the 
materiality of supplemental disclosures.90 For Delaware corporations, 
however, information is material only “if there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how 
to vote.”91  
The recent Delaware standard for the approval of disclosure settlements 
was set forth in Trulia: 
                                                                                                                 
*6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (“If it were not for the reasonable reliance of the parties on 
formerly settled practice in this Court . . . the interests of the Class might merit rejection of a 
settlement encompassing a release that goes far beyond the claims asserted and the results 
achieved.”).  
 85. In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 726 (7th Cir. 2016) (reversing 
and remanding district court approval of disclosure settlement). 
 86. Kazman v. Frontier Oil Corp., 398 S.W.3d 377, 388 (Tex. App. 2013) (affirming the 
approval of the settlement agreement and modifying trial court decision to remove the 
attorney’s fees awarded to class counsel).  
 87. New York state courts were among the first to refuse to approve settlements 
providing immaterial relief, but several early settlement refusals have been reversed on 
appeal. See, e.g., Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Index No. 653084/13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 
19, 2014), 2014 WL 7250212, at *2, rev’d, 148 A.D.3d 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) 
(reversing trial court refusal to approve a settlement in which supplemental disclosures were 
deemed immaterial); City Trading Fund v. Nye, No. 651668/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 
2015), 2015 WL 93894, at *19, rev’d, 144 A.D.3d 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (same); In re 
Allied Healthcare S’holder Litig., No. 652188/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2015), 2015 WL 
6499467, at *1 (“Not one of the additional disclosures the defendants included in the 
supplement to the proxy at class counsels’ urging could be characterized as significant nor 
would the failure to make any of the additional disclosures have resulted in this Court 
issuing a preliminary injunction to prevent or delay the merger.”). 
 88. See Vergiev v. Aguero, Docket No.: L-2276-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 6, 
2016). 
 89. See Corwin v British Am. Tobacco PLC, No. 14 CVS 8130, 2016 WL 635191 (N.C. 
Super. Feb. 17, 2016); In re Newbridge Bancorp S’holder Litig., No. 15 CVS 9251, 2016 
WL 6885882 (N.C. Super. Nov. 22, 2016). 
 90. See, e.g., Corwin , 2016 WL 635191 (N.C. Super. Feb. 17, 2016). 
 91. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (adopting standard of 
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). Said differently, information 
is material if, from the perspective of a reasonable stockholder, there is a substantial 
likelihood that it “significantly alter[s] the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” 
Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449). 
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[P]ractitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are 
likely to be met with continued disfavor in the future unless the 
supplemental disclosures address a plainly material 
misrepresentation or omission . . . . In using the term “plainly 
material,” I mean that it should not be a close call that the 
supplemental information is material as that term is defined 
under Delaware law.92 
The Trulia opinion provides a thorough review of the distortions introduced 
by disclosure settlements that led to an explosion of deal litigation and 
critiques the incentives given to parties to file and settle such claims. As 
such, the opinion can be cited not only for its holding, but as a useful 
summary for courts that are less familiar with these cases. 
Trulia, obviously, is controlling authority in Delaware, and its reasoning 
has been adopted by courts in other jurisdictions.93 In cases involving a 
Delaware-incorporated company in another jurisdiction, an argument can 
be made that Trulia applies under the internal affairs doctrine, which holds 
that the law of the forum applies to matters of procedure, but the law of the 
state of incorporation applies to matters of substance.94 Under this doctrine, 
the general rules of applying for settlement approval and the overall 
requirement that the settlement be “fair,” “reasonable,” and (in federal 
court) “adequate” are procedural and therefore controlled by the law of the 
forum.95 But the standards to apply in making these determinations are 
substantive and therefore controlled by the law of the state of incorporation.  
At least one court has held that Trulia is substantive law and therefore 
controlling authority.96 But an alternative argument, were a court to deem 
Trulia’s holding procedural and therefore not controlling outside of 
Delaware, is that the decision presents a persuasive rubric for analyzing a 
settlement, particularly where the forum’s own standard for judging fairness 
                                                                                                                 
 92. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898-99 (Del. Ch. 2016).  
 93. See, e.g., In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725-26 (7th Cir. 
2016); Statement of Reasons in Vergiev, supra note 23, at 6-9.  
 94. See generally, Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and 
Tentative Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480 (2002); see also 
Griffith & Lahav, supra note 20, at 1066.  
 95. 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:41 (4th 
ed. 2002).  
 96. See Final Order and Judgment in Vergiev, supra note 23; Statement of Reasons in 
Vergiev, supra note 23, at 6-9.  
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hearings is similar to that of Delaware.97 Many jurisdictions tend to follow 
Delaware law on business matters, given the volume of cases decided in 
Delaware.98  
Here, plaintiff’s own brief can often be used in aid of an objection, as 
many plaintiffs themselves suggest that Delaware case law is authoritative 
and make frequent citation to Chancery cases in support of a settlement.99 
These briefs, however, tend to draw from pre-2015 cases and omit more 
recent, and skeptical, Delaware authority. An objection can hit two birds 
with one stone, both highlighting a plaintiff’s omission of more recent 
authority and simultaneously arguing that Trulia, and other recent Delaware 
case law, is persuasive.  
Finally, an objection should draw attention to the parallels between the 
settlement at bar and the paradigm of meritless, disclosure-only litigation 
outlined in Trulia. These involve (1) the filing of a flurry of cases following 
an acquisition announcement, (2) agreement by defendants to “self-
expedite” and produce “core documents,” (3) a settlement based on 
supplemental disclosures, (4) cursory confirmatory discovery, and (5) a 
request for settlement approval without the benefit of adversarial 
briefing.100 Drawing express parallels with Trulia and other recent case law 
serves to put a case in context. 
The critical work of the objector’s brief, however, lies not in establishing 
general problems with merger litigation, but in proving that those problems 
are present in the settlement at hand. Thus, after briefly establishing this 
larger context and situating a settlement as the type disfavored by Trulia 
and later opinions, an objection should demonstrate problems with a 
particular settlement. Trulia provides a good roadmap for how to do so by 
focusing on the three elements that a plaintiff must demonstrate for a 
settlement to be approved: that the disclosures were “plainly material,” that 
the release is narrowly tailored, and that the claims released have been 
adequately investigated.101 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Most states, including Delaware, adopt a version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23. In addition, Trulia can be considered to supply Delaware’s approach to the substance of 
determining what it means for a settlement to be fair and reasonable. See Trulia, 129 A.3d at 
890-99. 
 98. See, e.g., Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 725 (adopting Trulia in the Seventh Circuit on the 
basis of Delaware’s experience with merger litigation). 
 99. See, e.g., Vergiev Reply Brief, supra note 29, at 7 (citing to Delaware case law from 
1976 and 1989 in support of award of fees).  
 100. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 891-94. 
 101. Id. at 898.  
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3. Challenge the Disclosures 
Key to evaluating a post-Trulia disclosure settlement is a balancing of 
the “give” and the “get” for the stockholder class, which involves a 
comparison of the value of the supplemental disclosures with that of the 
potential claims bargained away by the release.102 As Trulia recognized, in 
the absence of an adversarial hearing, a court must become “essentially a 
forensic examiner of proxy materials.”103 A strong objection should seek to 
assist a judge in this task. 
A simple step that any objector should consider is whether plaintiffs 
have provided the court with ready access to the materials necessary to 
evaluate the disclosures. As noted above, plaintiffs often attach only the 
supplemental disclosures to their papers. An objection may assist the court 
simply by providing a copy of the proxy and explaining the changes, or 
even by providing a red-line copy. An objection may also highlight how 
class counsel have advanced (and abandoned) disclosure and fiduciary duty 
claims throughout the course of litigation. For instance, the Riverbed 
objection included a table tracking the history of lawsuits filed, claims 
asserted, claims abandoned, and claims settled.104 
The crux of this argument, however, is an attack on each supplemental 
disclosure, demonstrating how it did not provide stockholders with “plainly 
material” information. The objection should demonstrate where plaintiffs 
have not met that standard, but rather merely made “a superficially 
persuasive argument that it is better for stockholders to have more 
information rather than less.”105  
Given the wide variety of disclosures that might be raised in any 
settlement, an exhaustive list of all possible arguments is beyond the scope 
of this article. Instead, it is more helpful to use as a model a single class of 
supplemental disclosure—in this case, the provision of additional detail 
regarding financial projections. For these disclosures, we then 
(1) demonstrate how plaintiffs have offered such disclosures as purportedly 
material settlement consideration; (2) illustrate how the law regarding such 
disclosures has evolved over time; and (3) mention some of the difficulties 
faced by objectors in convincing a court that the disclosures are not 
                                                                                                                 
 102. In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1043 (Del. Ch. 
2015) (stating that in evaluating settlements, the court must “assess[] the reasonableness of 
the ‘give’ and the ‘get’”). 
 103. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 894. 
 104. See Objection of Sean J. Griffith to Proposed Settlement in Riverbed, supra note 23, 
at 6.  
 105. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 894. 
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material. Once we cover that category of disclosures in detail, we will 
briefly discuss other issues that commonly arise in disclosure settlements. 
a) Additional Financial Projections 
As part of M&A disclosure settlements, plaintiffs often secure additional 
disclosures regarding the target company’s financial projections, arguing 
that such information is “plainly material” because it allows stockholders to 
either test the banker’s existing evaluation or run their own independent 
financial analysis.106 The extent of the additional disclosures may vary from 
entire financial analyses considered by bankers107 to additional, undisclosed 
line items from a financial summary.108 Courts are then left, often without 
expert guidance, to assess whether the additional financial information is 
plainly material or whether it is simply additional data.109 
In arguing for the materiality of this valuation information, plaintiffs 
regularly cite two cases, In re Netsmart Technologies, Inc. Shareholders 
Litigation and Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc.,110 
that contain broad language regarding the materiality of financial 
projections and, particularly, unlevered free cash flows. For instance, a 
plaintiff may suggest that Maric Capital stands for the proposition that 
disclosures are material—indeed, sufficiently material to enjoin a merger—
where a board selectively discloses only some of the projections relied upon 
by its financial advisors.111 Similarly, Netsmart contains readily quotable 
language regarding why “[a] reasonable stockholder deciding how to [vote 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See id. at 898-01, 901 n.57. 
 107. See In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 201-02 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (noting that the proxy omitted entire set of financial projections ultimately used in 
fairness opinion). 
 108. See Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiffs’ Petition for an Award of Attorneys’ 
Fees and Expenses and the Court’s Ruling at 67:2-17, In re Baker Hughes Inc. S’holders 
Litig., C.A. No. 10390-CB (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral 
Argument in Baker Hughes] (supplemental disclosures added “several line items” to already 
disclosed projections “to get to a bottom-line estimate of free cash flows”). 
 109. See Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898-99.  
 110. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 203; Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., 
11 A.3d 1175, 1177-78 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 111. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion for Final 
Approval of Proposed Settlement and Negotiated Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses and in 
Reply to the Sole Objection at 17-18, Bushansky v. Phoenix Cos., Docket No. (X08) FST-
CV-15-6027891-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2017). Notably, the Phoenix court ultimately 
concluded, largely based on an affidavit from Plaintiff’s expert, that the disclosures in that 
case were material. See Bushansky v. Phoenix Cos., No. X08FSTCV156027891S, 2017 WL 
1194768, at **3-4 (Ct. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2017). 
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on a cash-out merger] would find it material to know what the best estimate 
was of the company’s expected future cash flows.”112 Post-Trulia, plaintiffs 
are even more likely to advocate for the materiality of financial disclosures 
because they form the basis of one of the few disclosure settlements of 
2016 approved by the Delaware Court of Chancery.113 
The broad language of Netsmart and Maric Capital, however, rest upon 
their particular facts. For instance, Netsmart held that if a proxy discloses a 
banker’s support for a transaction, “the valuation methods used to arrive at 
[a banker’s] opinion as well as the key inputs and range of ultimate values 
generated by those analyses must also be fairly disclosed.”114 But it did so 
in the context of a proxy that omitted an entire set of final projections relied 
upon by the bankers, and instead disclosed an earlier set of figures.115 
Similarly, although Maric Capital stated that “management’s best estimate 
of the future cash flow of a corporation that is proposed to be sold in a cash 
merger is clearly material information,”116 the broader rule was stated in the 
context of undisclosed free cash flow figures produced by management and 
relied upon by the financial advisors in preparing their fairness opinion. 
These distinctions may often be glossed over by plaintiffs’ counsel seeking 
to tout the materiality of supplemental disclosures. 
Because Maric Capital was decided in 2010, however, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery has revisited the question of additional financial 
disclosures several times and has considerably narrowed the scope of 
Netsmart and Maric Capital. For instance, in two separate opinions in the 
same case, the court rejected the argument that unlevered free cash flows 
are per se material where the figures are derived by bankers, rather than 
management.117 Similarly, Chancellor Bouchard recently distinguished 
Netsmart, Maric Capital, and BTU to find that the disclosure of additional 
line items in an already disclosed financial projection was not material, 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 177. 
 113. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, In re BTU Int’l, Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. 
No. 10310-CB (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016).  
 114. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 203-04.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., 11 A.3d 1175, 1178 (Del. 
Ch. 2010). 
 117. See Nguyen v. Barrett, C.A. No. 11511-VCG, 2016 WL 5404095, at *4 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 28, 2016); Nguyen v. Barrett, C. A. No. 11511-VCG, 2015 WL 5882709, at *4 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 8, 2015), appeal denied, No. 550, 2015, 2015 WL 5924668, at *1 (Del. Oct. 9, 
2015) (“Our case law provides that, where the bankers derive unlevered, after-tax free cash 
flows rather than relying on management projections, the inputs on which they rely are not 
per se subject to disclosure.”). 
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even if it did “provide helpful information for those stockholders who may 
be inclined to create their own DCF models.”118  
These cases suggest two obstacles that face an objector challenging the 
materiality of supplemental disclosures, particularly in courts outside of 
Delaware. First, the question of materiality is fact-driven and varies from 
case to case. There are some general principles: in disclosing a banker’s 
analysis, all that is required is a “fair summary” of the banker’s work.119 
The addition of granular details may not rise to the level of materiality.120 
Shareholders are not entitled to all details necessary to replicate the 
financial advisor’s work.121 But these principles are derived from specific 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Transcript of Oral Argument in Baker Hughes, supra note 108, at 70:15-24. 
 119. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 900 (Del. Ch. 2016) 
(emphasizing that “[a] fair summary, however, is a summary”). Chancellor Bouchard 
explained the importance of not departing from the “fair summary” standard: 
It is all too common for a plaintiff to identify and obtain supplemental 
disclosure of a laundry list of minutiae in a financial advisor’s board 
presentation that does not appear in the summary of the advisor’s analysis in 
the proxy materials—summaries that commonly run ten or more single-spaced 
pages in the first instance. Given that the newly added pieces of information 
were, by definition, missing from the original proxy, it is not difficult for an 
advocate to make a superficially persuasive argument that it is better for 
stockholders to have more information rather than less. 
Id. at 894; accord In re Micromet, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 7197-VCP, 2012 WL 
681785, at *11 (Del Ch. Feb. 29, 2012) (“Stockholders are entitled to ‘a fair summary of the 
substantive work performed by the investment bankers,’ but ‘Delaware courts have 
repeatedly held that a board need not disclose specific details of the analysis underlying a 
financial advisor’s opinion.’” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)); In re Cogent, Inc. 
S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 511 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding stockholders are entitled to fair 
summary but not minutiae, and rejecting requests for additional disclosures). 
 120. Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Intervene and for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees 
and Expenses at 9, In re Amylin Pharm. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 7673-CS (Del. Ch. Feb. 
5, 2013) (“You don’t have to disclose details. You have to disclose the material information 
relevant to understanding the banker’s thing.”); Defendants’ Brief in Support of Proposed 
Settlement and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at 
22, In re Theragenics Corp. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 8790-VCL, (Del. Ch. May 5, 
2014), 2014 WL 1867128 (rejecting supplemental disclosures that “add nothing more than 
further granular detail”). 
 121. In re Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 8090-VCN, 2013 WL 
1909124, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013) (highlighting that a financial analyst’s “duty to 
disclose financial information material to their decision does not include information that is 
merely helpful; it also does not require that stockholders have sufficient information to make 
an independent determination of fair value”); accord Globis Partners, L.P. v. Plumtree 
Software, Inc., C.A. No. 1577-VCP, 2007 WL 4292024 at *12-13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2007) 
(“Delaware law does not require disclosure of all the data underlying a fairness opinion such 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss1/8
2017]        OBJECTIONS TO DISCLOSURE SETTLEMENTS 307 
 
 
cases, each with their own facts, and do not easily lend themselves to 
bright-line rules. 
Second, as can be seen from decisions such as BTU and Baker Hughes, 
much of Delaware case law relating to the materiality of disclosures is 
found in transcript rulings, rather than cases included in the Atlantic 
Reporters or compiled by Lexis or Westlaw. These rulings, which are 
precedential in Delaware, form a layer of supplemental authority more 
readily available to frequent practitioners in mergers and acquisitions 
litigation than for non-specialists.122 However difficult it may be to find 
these transcripts, establishing the “state of the art” on a question of 
materiality will be difficult without reference to them.  
b) Other Categories of Disclosures 
Every settlement will have a distinct set of supplemental disclosures, and 
a complete evaluation of each would require a treatise (if it were possible at 
all). There are several factors, however, that objectors should consider 
regarding any disclosure put forth in support of a settlement, regardless of 
content. 
Has the “New” Information Already Been Disclosed? More often than 
one might suspect, plaintiffs present old material as valuable, new 
information. In both Trulia and Walgreen, the reviewing court noted that 
some of the supplemental information had already been disclosed in the 
original proxy.123 Potential objectors should closely scrutinize proxy 
statements in search of supplemental disclosures that duplicate previously 
disclosed information.  
Can the additional information be derived from material already in the 
proxy? Courts have found that additional information that could be derived 
                                                                                                                 
that a shareholder can make an independent determination of value.”); In re Pure Res., Inc., 
S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 449 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting in fair summary discussion that 
stockholders would find it material to know the advisor’s basic valuation exercises, key 
assumption of those exercises, and range of values produced). 
 122. Cf. Edward M. McNally, The Delaware Court of Chancery Speaks by Transcript, 
LAW TECH. NEWS, Sept. 14, 2012 (noting that obtaining transcript opinions is “not cheap”). 
 123. See, e.g., In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(stating that disclosure of risk factors “were based on language found in the proxy 
statement”); Trulia, 129 A.3d at 902-03 (noting that amount of synergies included in 
supplemental disclosure had already been included in the proxy); see also Order After 
Hearing on March 30, 2017 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action 
Settlement, Anderson v. Alexza Pharms., Inc., Case No. 16-CV-295357, 2-3 (Cal. Super. 
Ct.—Santa Clara Cty. Apr. 3, 2017).  
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from “simple arithmetic from data in the proxy statement” is not plainly 
material.124 
Does the information merely confirm a non-occurrence? Objectors 
should attack supplemental disclosures that simply confirm the non-
occurrence of an event that might have been material had it occurred. As a 
general rule, “[i]f a disclosure document does not say that the board or its 
advisors did something, then the reader can infer that it did not happen.”125 
Thus, courts have found immaterial certain disclosures that stated 
management had not adjusted financial projections126 or confirmed that 
buyers did not discuss with seller’s management post-merger employment 
during deal negotiations.127  
Does the disclosure support the merger? Finally, objectors should 
consider whether supplemental disclosures would have discouraged 
stockholders from voting in favor of a transaction. Even if such disclosures 
might be material, however, they are considered less valuable because 
directors already have an incentive to disclose information that would 
support their deal.128  
4. Challenge the Release 
Whereas a challenge to the disclosures argues that the plaintiff class has 
received little or no benefit, a challenge to the release argues that approval 
of the settlement would require the class to abandon claims without 
receiving commensurate compensation. This attack focuses on the kitchen-
sink breadth of the typical release. Prior to Trulia, these releases 
encompassed claims “known and unknown,” “ripe and unripe,” 
“investigated and uninvestigated,” and otherwise threw as expansive a net 
as possible. 
Since Trulia, however, the Delaware Court of Chancery has approved a 
small number of disclosure settlements with narrower releases.129 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 722. 
 125. In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1132 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id.; Statement of Reasons in Vergiev, supra note 23, at 8.  
 128. See In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 
5458041, at *5 n.18 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (“While it is possible that ‘positive’ 
disclosures may add materially to the total mix of information considered by a stockholder, a 
board of directors has every reason to make such positive disclosures in support of an action 
it has recommended; little judicial oversight is needed with respect to such disclosures.”). 
 129. See In re BTU Int’l, Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10310-CB, 2016 WL 680252 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016); In re NPS Pharm. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10553-VCN, 2016 
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plaintiffs have cited to these cases in support of disclosure settlements when 
challenged by objectors.130 For instance, although the Delaware Court of 
Chancery approved a settlement in February 2016 that nominally released 
claims under foreign and administrative law, it did so with specific 
reservations: 
 The release, as revised, is consistent, in my judgment, with 
the scope of a release that would pass muster under Trulia 
because it is limited to the release of disclosure claims and 
fiduciary duty claims relating to the decision to enter the merger. 
 It would be better, in an ideal world, that the release not 
include words like “foreign claims” or “regulatory claims,” and 
counsel, in the future, should exclude such terms because they 
really have no relevance to the nature of the claims that are being 
released. But in this circumstance, I view the inclusion of those 
phrases in this release as a product of the editing, as the revision 
process occurred post-Trulia in forming this particular 
release . . . .131 
Notably, a later release in In re Regado Biosciences, Inc. Stockholder 
Litigation, approved on July 27, 2016, did not include such claims.132 Thus, 
a strong objection should indicate where a proposed release extends beyond 
the latest “state of the art” releases approved by courts in the relevant 
jurisdiction or the Delaware Court of Chancery. 
An objector should also be mindful of the scope of claims brought by 
plaintiffs in their complaint. For instance, if plaintiffs sued in federal court, 
they may have omitted state-law fiduciary-duty claims. While we are not 
aware of a federal court that has addressed this argument to date, the logic 
of decisions like Walgreen and Trulia suggest that a release should only 
cover claims that were brought, or could have been brought, in the case. 
Likewise, plaintiffs often structure a release such that the class effectively 
releases any claims that it might have against the named plaintiffs or their 
counsel, and an objection can bring such discrepancies to the reviewing 
court’s attention.  
                                                                                                                 
WL 680256 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016); In re Regado Biosciences, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 
C.A. No. 10606-CB, 2016 WL 4040729 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2016). 
 130. See, e.g., Vergiev Reply Brief, supra note 29, at 14 (arguing that “the extent Trulia 
altered the analysis of disclosure-based settlements in Delaware . . . is far from clear given 
the post-Trulia final approval orders in BTU and NPS Pharmaceuticals”). 
 131. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, supra note 113, at 40.  
 132. See Regado, 2016 WL 4040729, at *2.  
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Plaintiffs frequently raise two related arguments when challenged 
regarding a release. The first is that the released claims were not, in 
plaintiff’s estimation, worth much, and that the release thus gives up 
nothing at all. The second is that unless an objector means to take over the 
case and pursue claims for money damages—typically long after the 
transaction has closed—the objector implicitly agrees that the released 
claims have no value. 
There are a number of answers to these arguments. First, these 
contentions fundamentally misapprehend what a class stands to lose from a 
broad release: “[T]he option value of having some more diligent plaintiff be 
able to come forward with a damages action in the future, if there is 
something that arises.”133 Indeed, one of the factors leading to the Trulia 
decision was the recognition that claims that later proved valuable had 
come close to being released in disclosure settlements.134 Courts have 
rejected settlements that never received an objection by plaintiffs’ counsel 
interested in taking over the case.135 
Second, the restoration of adversarial proceedings in disclosure 
settlements would be undermined if objectors were only encouraged to 
present arguments where they believed the claims held actual, current 
value, rather than the “option value” described in Transatlantic.136 Courts 
have recognized that the over-litigation of M&A cases creates drain on the 
American economy.137 This problem would not be addressed by a system 
that allowed objections only in those cases where the objector could find 
evidence of underlying value such that the objector was willing to litigate 
the case. 
5. Challenge the Investigation 
An objection may also challenge whether claims that fall within the 
scope of a post-Trulia release have been investigated by plaintiffs’ counsel 
to a degree sufficient to support a release of claims. This prong of Trulia 
speaks to the same concern as the limitation on the scope of a release: 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See In re Transatlantic Holdings, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6574-CS, 2013 WL 
1191738, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013). 
 134. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 895, 895 n.32 (Del. Ch. 
2016). 
 135. See Transatlantic, 2013 WL 1191738, at *3. 
 136. Id. at *2. 
 137. See, e.g., In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(“The type of class action illustrated by this case—the class action that yields fees for class 
counsel and nothing for the class—is no better than a racket. It must end.”). 
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plaintiffs in the habit of pursuing quickly filed complaints will inadvertently 
give up valuable claims, or even turn the other way when evidence of 
misconduct does appear.138 
Although plaintiffs generally bear the burden of demonstrating that a 
settlement passes muster, they often provide reviewing courts with little 
detail regarding the scope of the investigation beyond brief descriptions of 
depositions and vague assertions that “thousands” of pages of documents 
were reviewed. An objection may highlight these faults to a reviewing 
court. 
The limited production of “core documents” by defendants prior to the 
MOU is one red flag that an objection should highlight. Delaware courts 
have described these documents—mostly board minutes, banker 
presentations, and where applicable, documents reviewed by special 
committees—as production intended to facilitate disclosure settlements.139 
Indeed, one Vice Chancellor has gone so far as to note that if a plaintiff 
“were actually going to litigate a case and litigate a preliminary injunction 
or litigate an expedited trial, there is no way [the plaintiff] would just accept 
those core documents.”140  
                                                                                                                 
 138. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearings and Rulings of the Court at 59-61, 73, 
In re Aruba Networks, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015) 
(emphasizing that plaintiffs’ counsel failed to pursue evidence of misconduct unearthed 
during discovery); Transcript of Settlement Hearings and Rulings of the Court at 39, 
Haverhill Ret. Sys. v. Asali, C.A. No. 9474-VCL (Del. Ch. June 8, 2015) (“The fundamental 
problem in this case is I simply do not know the types of things that may have gone on here 
or the types of things that might be covered by this global release.”).  
 139. See Trulia, 129 A.3d at 892; In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 
1116, 1121 (describing “the standard categories of documents that defendants routinely 
produce to facilitate a disclosure-only settlement”). 
 140. Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Proceedings and 
Rulings of the Court at 26-27, City of Daytona Beach Police & Fire Pension Fund v. 
Examworks Grp., Inc., C.A. No. 12481-VCL (Del. Ch. filed June 17, 2016). Vice Chancellor 
Laster’s commentary, although given in ruling on a motion to expedite, is worth quoting at 
length: 
[Y]our proposal focused on, at least in the first instance, the customary core 
documents, which, for better or for worse -- and you now will hear a skeptical 
view -- was something that was essentially worked out as a matter of practice 
with people who really weren’t interested in litigating cases. And so what 
turned out to be the customary core documents, yeah, they were core 
documents, but if you were actually going to litigate a case and litigate a 
preliminary injunction or litigate an expedited trial, there is no way you would 
just accept those core documents. If really what you wanted was a disclosure-
only settlement, then, yeah, you would be content with just those core 
documents. That would be fine. 
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Similarly, an objection can highlight the scope of deposition testimony 
taken by plaintiffs’ counsel. In Trulia, counsel took three depositions, two 
before the parties agreed to settle and one in confirmatory discovery.141 
Many settlements are based on less, including cases in which no defendants 
are deposed, only bankers. Unless an objector is willing and able to bear the 
expense of seeking discovery himself, access to the content of deposition 
testimony may be limited, but an objection may at least highlight the 
volume of discovery or lack of detail regarding the extent thereof.142  
Again, plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that claims have been 
sufficiently investigated.143 A good objection focuses on reasons to doubt 
that discovery was aimed at uncovering the real strength of claims being 
released, rather than ticking the boxes required at a fairness hearing. 
6. Challenge Attorneys’ Fees 
Motions for approval of disclosure settlements are usually coupled with 
motions for an award of fees to plaintiffs’ counsel.144 Settlements, however, 
are typically not conditioned on an award of attorneys’ fees.145 Thus, even 
when a judge is inclined to approve a settlement, an objector may argue in 
the alternative that the achievements do not merit a substantial fee award 
because the settlement is of very little real value to the class.146  
As with the arguments on the merits, a strong objection can provide 
adversarial rigor to the application for attorneys’ fees.147 The following list, 
while not exhaustive, may provide fodder for an objector challenging an 
award of fees. 
Is the requested fee award in line with recent precedent? Even before 
Trulia, and particularly after that ruling, fee awards for disclosure 
settlements have declined, at least in Delaware. For instance, the recent 
BTU and Regado awards were limited to $325,000 and $300,000, inclusive 
of expenses, respectively.148 Plaintiffs seeking greater rewards will often 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 141. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 893. 
 142. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 27, at 1631, 1631 n.29; Lahav, supra note 20, at 
85-86. 
 143. See Fisch, Griffith & Solomon, supra note 49, at 569.  
 144. See, e.g., id. at 573-74.  
 145. See, e.g., id.  
 146. See, e.g., id. at 568.  
 147. See id. at 569.  
 148. See In re BTU Int’l, Inc. Stockholders Litig., Case No. 10310-CB, 2016 WL 
680252, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016); In re Regado Biosciences, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 
C.A. No. 10606-CB, 2016 WL 4040729, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2016). 
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cite to older settlements in order to justify higher fees. An objection 
provides the opportunity to demonstrate where these benchmarks are 
misleading. 
Apart from recent settlements, another good source for context in 
disclosure fee awards is Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion in In re Sauer-
Danfoss Inc. Shareholders Litigation.149 That ruling collects many 
disclosure settlements, separating them into three categories based upon the 
value of the supplemental disclosures to stockholders, the degree of 
investigation and litigation conducted in the case, and the fee award.150 
While it does not reflect events in post-Trulia stockholder litigation, it can 
provide an easily accessible benchmark for fee awards. 
Have plaintiffs made an attempt to reduce duplication of effort? The use 
of lodestars to justify fee awards presents a perverse incentive to 
representative counsel, because a higher lodestar makes it easier to justify a 
higher fee. It is not uncommon to see four, five, or more law firms joining 
together to represent multiple clients in disclosure cases, adding hundreds 
of hours to the lodestar on behalf of different clients.151 Each firm typically 
submits affidavits describing its own efforts, which allows an objector to 
compare the submissions and make rough judgments as to whether efforts 
have been coordinated to reduce cost. 
Are counsel’s rates reasonable for the jurisdiction? Plaintiff’s counsel 
often base their lodestar on rates that can exceed $700 per hour.152 These 
rates may be in line with prevailing fees in New York or Delaware. Courts 
in other jurisdictions, however, have cut fees where the lodestars were 
justified by rates greater than those common for local counsel.153 
                                                                                                                 
 149. 65 A.3d 1116 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 150. See id. at apps. A, B, C.  
 151. In the Vergiev case, for instance, plaintiffs provided over a dozen separate affidavits 
from law firms to support their lodestar. See Certification of Audra Depaolo in Support of 
Plaintiff’ Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Award of Attorneys’ Fees and 
Reimbursement of Expenses Exs. 4-18, Vergiev v. Aguero, Docket No.: L-2276-15 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. June 6, 2016) (attaching affidavits in support of fees from Faruqi & 
Faruqi, LLP; Kirby McInerney LLP; Cohn Lifland Pearlman Herrman & Knopf LLP; 
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A.; Johnson & Weaver, LLP; Ryan & Maniskas, LLP; Kahn, Swick & 
Foti, LLC; Abraham, Fruchter & Twersky, LLP; Levi & Korsinsky LLP; Gardy & Notis, 
LLP; Pomerantz LLP; and Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C.).  
 152. See, e.g., Affidavit of Miles D. Schreiner in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final 
Approval of Class Action Settlement and Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and 
Expenses at 1, Vergiev, Docket No.: L-2276-15. 
 153. See, e.g., In re Newbridge Bancorp S’holder Litig., 15 CVS 9251, 2016 WL 
6885882, at *13-15, *18 (N.C. Super. Nov. 22, 2016) (finding that prevailing rates for North 
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Does the benefit to the class merit a fee? It is not unheard of for a court 
to determine that plaintiffs secured supplemental disclosures sufficient to 
support a settlement but not to justify a significant award to plaintiff’s 
counsel.154  
Ultimately, a peppercorn settlement merits a peppercorn fee. Even where 
a court grants approval of a settlement, a strong objection can still add value 
to the settlement process by providing evidence in support of the argument 
that the settlement does not justify plaintiff’s fee request. 
D. Anticipating Possible Opposition 
It would be naïve to expect that plaintiffs’ counsel, particularly those 
who for the last ten years have been involved in a multimillion dollar 
industry of litigating almost every major merger and profiting from 
disclosure settlements, would simply stand aside when an objector appears. 
That said, it has happened.155 More often, however, the parties to a 
settlement attempt to defend their work and attack the objector. Again, 
while every case is different, based on our experience, class counsel often 
employ two techniques to dissuade objectors: attacks on an objector’s 
integrity and the use of discovery. 
1. Distinguishing Meritorious Objections From Those of “Professional 
Objectors” 
In almost every case in which Professor Griffith objected, plaintiffs have 
attacked either Professor Griffith, his counsel, or both, as “professional 
objectors” seeking to profit by interfering with a settlement. These 
accusations come with more than a little irony—plaintiffs, after all, are 
simultaneously seeking fees for their work.  
The “professional objector” label is normally reserved for objectors who 
seek to be bought off by class counsel in exchange for withdrawing an 
objection.156 As discussed above,157 we are unaware of any such objectors 
in the context of disclosure settlements and doubt they will become 
                                                                                                                 
Carolina business attorneys were less than for Delaware counsel, and reducing fees to an 
implied hourly rate of $258.00).  
 154. See, e.g., id. at *18 (finding that supplemental disclosures were “of only marginal 
benefit to the Class” and did not justify plaintiff’s full fee request); In re Riverbed Tech., 
Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 
2015) (reducing fees from requested $500,000 to $329,881.61, taking into account the 
“modest benefit conferred”). 
 155. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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common anytime soon. Because plaintiffs typically raise this argument in 
their reply brief after the objector has appeared, however, an objector may 
have a limited opportunity to present rebuttals.  
Counsel should therefore anticipate the argument and, rather than wait 
for oral argument or a sur-reply, distinguish himself and his client from the 
“professional” variety in the objection itself. In addition, an objector can 
offer to assuage concerns on this point by providing an affidavit attesting 
that he or she will not sell or settle an objection without court approval.  
2. Discovery 
Finally, our experience is that some, but not all, plaintiffs seek discovery 
from objectors challenging a disclosure settlement. Again, there is an irony 
here, in that plaintiffs often provide no discovery into their positions or 
litigation history, and defendants often produce nothing beyond the “core 
documents” and confirmatory discovery agreed between the parties. Real, 
adversarial discovery will be left for the objector. 
These discovery requests miss the point of the objection, which will 
rarely be based on any facts specific to the objector but will nevertheless 
involve substantial effort on the parts of objector and counsel. Document 
requests may run dozens of pages and purport to require production of 
information in formats that individual stockholders (or their counsel) are 
not readily equipped to produce. 
Where such requests are overly burdensome and the costs of responding 
outweigh a reasonable benefit, response requires careful consideration of 
local discovery rules and mores. Many jurisdictions require a meet-and-
confer between counsel before discovery disputes are brought to the court, 
and this allows counsel to present creative solutions to discovery disputes. 
For instance, if plaintiffs suggest they want “all documents relating to the 
transaction” to understand an objector’s stance on presently viable causes of 
action, objector’s counsel can offer to provide an affidavit. 
Another way of diffusing discovery requests may be to point to the 
unnecessarily expedited nature of the settlement process and to ask for a 
delay of the settlement hearing to allow for discovery. Given that the 
transaction has already closed, settlement approval rarely involves any 
ticking clock. A request for a delay of the settlement hearing to allow, for 
instance, for more convenient scheduling of a deposition (particularly if it 
will reduce costs) may be reasonable. The request may also separate 
plaintiffs who legitimately need discovery from those who are simply 
hoping to drive away an objector.  
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To date, we are not aware of any court that has considered disclosure 
settlements and allowed plaintiffs to conduct wide-ranging discovery into 
objectors who present legal arguments concerning the over-litigation of 
corporate claims or adversarial presentations of plaintiffs’ own facts. For 
instance, in the Riverbed case, the settlement proponents’ motion to compel 
discovery of Professor Griffith was refused.158  
III. Why Represent Objectors?  
There are many reasons to object to disclosure settlements as a policy 
matter. Prior to Trulia, the near-automatic award of attorneys’ fees for 
insubstantial disclosure relief fueled the sue-on-every-deal phenomenon, 
imposing a litigation tax on every major corporate transaction.159 Disclosure 
settlements offered a perfect opportunity for rent-seeking: plaintiffs’ 
counsel could extract fees, defendants could ensure their deals would reach 
a vote (and purchase insurance in the unlikely event that improprieties came 
to light post-closing), and the deadweight loss was small enough to avoid 
inspiring organized stockholder challenge. Real opposition arose only at the 
point when almost every deal became subject to litigation—the point at 
which it became embarrassing.160 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Letter Opinion, In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG, 
2015 WL 4251189, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2015) (finding that objector’s “standing is a 
purely legal issue based on the date of acquisition of his stock; no further evidence-gathering 
on this issue is relevant”; that the opinions of an objector regarding settlement “speak for 
themselves”; and that an expedited schedule mitigated against “the inconvenience and 
expense of further discovery” into the objection).  
 159. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 26, at 1636.  
 160. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND 
FUTURE, 90 (2015) (noting that in the context of merger class actions, “incentives to sue 
have become excessive, and litigation is growing out of control, like algae in a petri dish”); 
see also OLGA KOUMRIAN, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC 
COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2014 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2015), https://www.cornerstone.com/ 
Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2014-Review.pdf (finding that in 2014, 
shareholders challenged approximately 93% of large mergers and acquisitions); Cain & 
Solomon, supra note 11; James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: 
Disciplining Managers in A World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 
27 (2016) (noting that “litigation against publicly-held companies that undertake deals is 
now of epidemic proportions”); Fisch, Griffith & Solomon, supra note 49, at 558 (“Multiple 
teams of plaintiffs file lawsuits challenging virtually every public company merger, often in 
multiple jurisdictions.” (footnote omitted)); Friedlander, supra note 12, at 919 (“There are 
system-wide negative effects from the longstanding grant of releases to defendants and 
continued subsidization of a plaintiff disclosure settlement bar that sued on every significant 
M&A transaction and collected significant fees . . . .”); Griffith, supra note 7, at 2 (“[T]he 
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The reintroduction of adversarial litigation to the settlement process 
provides one corrective to the perverse incentives that led to this rent-
seeking litigation that has drawn the integrity of the corporate bar into 
question. Simply put, if plaintiffs’ counsel can anticipate a loss whenever—
and wherever—they bring meritless litigation, they can be expected to bring 
fewer cases in the first place. Recognizing the importance of adversarial 
briefing, the Delaware Court of Chancery has gone so far as to consider 
appointing an amicus curiae, with fees taxed to the parties, to provide an 
adversarial evaluation of settlement consideration.161 The Seventh Circuit 
has similarly suggested that a trial judge confronted with doubts as to the 
value of a settlement should appoint an independent expert.162 
To date, however, we are unaware of any court actually appointing an 
amicus curiae—compensated or not—to evaluate a disclosure settlement. 
Yet courts have been willing to award fees to counsel who represented 
stockholder objectors, even in cases where settlements were ultimately 
approved.163 The mechanics of applying for such fees vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, and an objector’s counsel is well-advised to research those 
requirements at the same time that he or she evaluates a disclosure 
settlement. In particular, counsel should research what procedural steps 
need to be taken to seek fees before accepting representation, and make 
                                                                                                                 
problem is one of too much and not enough: too much in the way of filings, and not enough 
consideration at settlement. In terms of filings, virtually every merger transaction is 
challenged . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of 
Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 840-41, 895 
(2014) (finding indicia of agency costs in merger class action claims suggesting that the 
merits count for very little in such claims); Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status 
Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 155 
(2011) (discussing merger lawsuits as “cookie-cutter complaints”); Webber, supra note 67, 
at 909-10; Marianna Wonder, Note, The Changing Odds of the Chancery Lottery, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2381, 2382 (2016) (noting that the volume of merger filings and the 
“similarity between so many of these cases . . . indicates that M&A litigation has become 
routine, regardless of actual merit”).  
 161. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898-99 (Del. Ch. 2016); see 
also Letter from Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster to Counsel at 6-7, Haverhill Ret. Sys. v. 
Asali, C.A. No. 9474-VCL (Del. Ch. June 8, 2015) (proposing the appointment of an amicus 
curiae to assess the value of non-pecuniary relief). 
 162. See In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(noting that trial judge could “have appointed her own expert to explain the significance (or 
rather lack thereof) of the supplemental disclosures, and she should have done that given her 
doubts about the lawyers’ explanations” (internal citation omitted)). 
 163. See, e.g., In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG, 2015 
WL 7769861, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 2, 2015). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
318 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:281 
 
 
sure that any steps are taken to preserve the right to bring a fee request. 
Thus far, awards to objectors have not approached the six-figure fees 
routinely awarded to plaintiffs who secure merely “helpful” supplemental 
disclosures. The number of successful objections—let alone fee 
awards164—remains quite low, however, and as plaintiffs bring more cases 
outside of Delaware, there is reason to believe that opportunities to earn 
fees will be more common. After all, objectors provide a greater benefit to 
courts that are not used to confronting disclosure settlements, particularly 
where plaintiffs seek settlement approval and fees without disclosing 
relevant authority such as Trulia.  
Moreover, there are other advantages to taking up these cases for counsel 
interested in the state of M&A class action litigation. From a business 
perspective, these cases resolve themselves fairly quickly—largely due to 
the unnecessarily expedited briefing schedule demanded by the parties—
and thus do not require a law firm to warehouse a large inventory of slow-
moving cases. Assuming plaintiffs are unsuccessful in demanding 
discovery from an objector, disclosure settlements rarely turn on disputed 
factual issues that involve extensive discovery or document review. Instead, 
they tend to revolve around the presentation of complex, dynamic legal 
issues to courts that would otherwise be required to review settlements 
without adversarial presentation of issues.  
The cases are, to be honest, fun—at least by the standards of legal work. 
This litigation provides the rare opportunity to correct and to make manifest 
a misalignment of incentives among participants in a legal world who have, 
for far too long, profited from lawsuits brought against almost every 
transaction, no matter how well-intentioned a company’s directors or 
properly conducted the sale process. The correction of these incentives will 
eliminate a very lucrative market for a small but well-compensated portion 
of the plaintiffs’ bar, and this guarantees a vigorous resistance. This is good 
work, toward a good outcome, and more attorneys should involve 
themselves in it. 
                                                                                                                 
 164. The Walgreen objector, for instance, was represented by the Center for Class Action 
Fairness, a non-profit that did not seek fees. On the other hand, the unsuccessful objector in 
Phoenix Companies sought fees based upon the settling party’s post-objection agreement to 
modify the release, and the Phoenix court approved a settlement with objector’s counsel that 
permitted a fee of $72,000.00. See Stipulation and Order re: Objector James K. Webber’s 
Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees and Expenses or in the Alternative Motion for 
Reargument and Reconsideration, Bushansky v. Phoenix Cos., No. X08-FST-CV-15-
6027891-S (Ct. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2017).  
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Conclusion 
Counsel to objectors in disclosure settlements have the Fissian 
opportunity to do well while doing good. Objectors restore adversarial 
context to cases where the parties otherwise jointly seek a court’s blessing 
of settlements that may provide no benefit to absent stockholders. Well-
represented objections that present fulsome context to courts tasked with 
evaluating settlements not only add value to individual proceedings, but 
address an imbalance that led to the expansion of deal litigation “beyond 
the realm of reason.”165 The authors have been part of this movement, but 
with more than two-thirds of all transactions still subject to litigation, more 
work is necessary to stem this tide. It is our hope that other counsel will 
find this article useful in bringing objections to meritless disclosure 
settlements, thus adding their voices to the chorus proclaiming that enough 
is enough.  
 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 894. 
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